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THE PRICE OF EXPERIENCE: 
THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
J. Gregory Sidak* 
What is the price of experience? Do men buy it for a song? 
Or wisdom for a dance in the street? No, it is bought with the price 
Of all a man hath, his house, his wife, his children. 
Wisdom is sold in the desolate market where none come to buy, 
And in the wither'd field where the farmer plows for bread in vain. 
From William Blake's The Price of Experience (1797) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For a half-century, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
has been the starting point for judicial reasoning and academic 
conjuring about the separation of powers between Congress and 
the President and, more specifically, presidential prerogative as-
serted in the name of national security. 1 The collective experi-
ence acquired on September 11, 2001, has supplanted Youngs-
town. The memorable phrases in Youngstown still inspire, but 
they no longer reliably say what the law is, if one uses Oliver 
Wendell Holmes's formulation that "[t]he prophecies of what 
the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what 
I mean by the law."2 The Constitution did not change on Sep-
tember llth.3 The innocence of the current generation of 
* F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics Emeritus, American Enter-
prise Institute for Public Policy Research. I thank Michael Stokes Paulsen, Melinda Led-
den Sidak, and Leigh Tripoli for their generous comments and Louisa Fuller for valuable 
research assistance. I wrote this essay between December 2001 and January 2002 and, in 
the interest of keeping it a snapshot in time, have made minimal changes to account for 
subsequent events. ©2002 by J. Gregory Sidak. 
I. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,461 (1897). 
3. Consequently, I would not say that September 11th was a "constitutional mo-
ment" within Bruce Ackerman's framework of implicit amendment of the Constitution. 
See Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 
1991 ). 
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Americans changed. They read the same words now with a dif-
ferent experience. As a consequence, Youngstown will recede as 
a reliable predictor of the boundaries of presidential prerogative 
in matters of national security and, to a lesser extent, as the 
touchstone of separation-of-powers analysis. 
II. INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 
Innocence is a priori reasoning untested by empiricism, which 
is to say experience.4 I approach innocence and experience from 
the evolutionary perspective of Karl Popper, who described as 
"the principle of empiricism" the following proposition: "Only 'ex-
perience' can help us to make up our minds about the truth or fal-
sity of factual statements."5 Put another way, knowledge of the 
truth or falsity of an a priori proposition is held captive by the lim-
its of one's empirical experience. 
September 11th was, to use the language of statistics, an out-
of-sample event for Americans not old enough to remember Pearl 
Harbor. Americans were incredulous because, for most of them, 
nothing in their own experience would cause them to believe that 
such attacks were possible. The same lack of experience presuma-
bly caused the passengers on the two airlines that struck the World 
Trade Center towers never to consider that their hijackers in-
tended not to exact ransom but to use the airplanes as bombs. 
Even the current military appeared to have suffered from a lack of 
experience, despite its unquestioned institutional knowledge from 
prior wars. Only fourteen fighters were patrolling the entire 
United States at the time of the attacks.6 The Air Force Reserve 
jets that scrambled to Washington flew from Hampton, Virginia, 
and Falmouth, Massachusetts-not nearby Andrews Air Force 
Base.7 When they arrived and were ordered by the Secret Ser-
4. "Experience," wrote Immanuel Kant, "is without doubt the first product that our 
understanding brings forth as it works on the raw material of sensible sensations." Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 127 (Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, eds., Cambridge U. 
Press, 1998) (1781). He argued that "universal cognitions, which at the same time have 
the character of inner necessity, must be clear and certain for themselves, independently 
of experience; hence one calls them a priori cognitions: whereas that which is merely bor-
rowed from experience is, as it is put, cognized only a posteriori, or empirically." ld. 
5. Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach 12 (Oxford 
at the Clarandon Press, 1972). For an empirical view of constitutional interpretation that 
builds on Popper's theory of objective knowledge, and Friedrich Hayek's related theory 
of the evolutionary nature of markets, see J. Gregory Sidak, Mr. Justice Nemo's Social 
Statics, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 737 (2001). 
6. Matthew L. Wald and Kevin Sack, A Nation Challenged: The Tapes; "'We Have 
Some Planes,"' Hijacker Said on Sept. 11, N.Y. Times A1 (Oct. 16, 2001). 
7. !d. 
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vice to "protect the White House at all costs," it was too late.8 
The Pentagon was already in flames. It was not fighter planes 
that succeeded in defending the White House from the fourth 
team of terrorists, but rather a subset of We the People on 
United Airlines Flight 93. Like modern day Minutemen, they 
scuttled their hijacked airliner in Pennsylvania after learning by 
cell phone that more lives than their own would be lost if they 
failed to resist. 
There is no reason to think that jurists and legal scholars are 
different from other Americans in the way that innocence and ex-
perience affect how they analyze a problem. Justice Holmes fa-
mously wrote: "[a] page of history is worth a volume of logic."9 
And it is said that the hardness of some of Holmes's judicial opin-
ions may have reflected his experience of having fought in the Civil 
War, during which time he was wounded on three occasions.10 For 
two generations or more, American legal scholars had little cause, 
even during the height of the Cold War, to consider constitutional 
matters that concerned the immediate defense and survival of the 
United States. There was some small chance that cities and strate-
gic targets in America would be incinerated in a nuclear puff, as 
was feared during the Cuban missile crisis, but there was no seri-
ous fear of a conventional attack causing massive civilian casual-
ties. 
By all accounts, the attacks of September 11th produced for 
millions of citizens an intensely personal process of revelation and 
reflection. I relate some of my own revelations and reflections, not 
because they are special in any way, but because they are mine, 
and thus they permit me to speak without speculation. Their fa-
miliarity helps me to express how constitutional interpretation at 
any moment in American history may reflect the tension between 
abstract reasoning and the shared experiences of events that have 
changed the lives of the nation's citizens. 
From my office in downtown Washington, I watched the huge 
plume of smoke rising from the Pentagon on the morning of Sep-
tember 11th. The experience gave me a new insight on facts that I 
already knew. My uncle, Bud, was a farm boy from Nebraska 
who became an aircraft mechanic in the Army Air Corps and 
was stationed at Hickam Field on Oahu. He was gravely 
8. Id. 
9. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,349 (1921). 
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, ed., The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Let· 
ters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ix-x 
(U. of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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wounded by shrapnel from a Japanese bomb on the morning of 
December 7, 1941, and for the remainder of his life suffered in 
body and mind, a ward of the Veterans Administration. My fa-
ther, unable to go to war because of polio, worked instead at a 
defense factory in San Diego that turned out aircraft parts. His 
older sister Annie stayed to help run the family farm while two 
younger sisters, Julia and Wilma, left Nebraska to work at the 
same factory in San Diego. Julia married a Marine paratrooper 
who later fought on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Wilma became a 
war widow, her hometown sweetheart killed during a bombing 
mission over Italy just before D Day. The youngest boy in the 
family, Don, also left the farm for San Diego and the same air-
craft plant. On his eighteenth birthday, he enlisted to become a 
naval aviator. At twenty, he flew torpedo bombers from aircraft 
carriers. During the Cold War, Major Sidak of the Strategic Air 
Command piloted a B-47 armed with thermonuclear bombs, his 
designated target the Kremlin. He and his brothers never re-
turned to work the farm. 
As a child, I knew these family stories. And though my 
childhood was spent in San Diego, a city still dominated in the 
1960s by the Navy and the defense industry, as a whole my un-
derstanding of the consequences of war and the price of peace 
had the vicarious translucence of a John Wayne movie. What I 
thought I understood, I knew not from experience, but from the 
innocent abstraction of someone who had been spared the con-
sequences of war through the sacrifices of others. Even when I 
had the tangible experience as a nine-year-old of climbing into 
the cockpit of Uncle Don's B-47, I did not comprehend that, if 
the order ever came for him to use the bomber for its intended 
purpose, the chances of our seeing one another again on this 
earth would be nonexistent. Several decades passed before I be-
gan to comprehend how much I had not understood. 
In 1996, after my father was gone and I had sons of my own, 
I found among his possessions the front-page of the Cedar 
County News from December 1941. Its banner headline reported 
Bud among the casualties at Pearl Harbor. My grandfather was 
quoted saying that he would gladly fight the Japanese himself if 
the Army would take him. To hold the yellowed newspaper in 
my hands was to hear the words of anger and grief passing from 
my grandfather's lips 55 years earlier, to comprehend, as if 
transported in a time machine, what Pearl Harbor meant for one 
father's love for his son, and what it would mean for the family 
into which I had not yet been born. Like an epiphany in a James 
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Joyce novel, the whatness of Pearl Harbor at that moment leapt 
to me "from the vestment of its appearance." 11 I understood how 
my own father and his siblings had dedicated themselves to 
obliterating the evil that had spilled their brother's blood one 
Sunday morning in 1941. Whether they took up arms or helped 
to make them, farmers became warriors, their fidelity measured 
by how these brothers and sisters led their lives and, in time, by 
how they strove to impart to their children a wisdom "bought 
with the price of all a man hath." 
III. THE EBB OF YOUNGSTOWN 
Measured by the standard of wisdom bought with experi-
ence, the abstract erudition of Supreme Court decisions im-
presses me less than it once did. Its purveyors are too susceptible 
to getting carried away with their wares, producing euphonic 
sophistry that is devoid of empirical perspective. A former law 
review president clerking on the Supreme Court probably could 
craft a respectable opinion that reasoned that American soldiers 
scaled the cliffs of Normandy to protect the separation of pow-
ers, "the better to secure liberty." 12 But a clever turn of phrase 
does not make an abstract proposition true. 
For the thousands murdered at the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon, the orations in Youngstown about the separation 
of powers rang hollow: These victims lost not only liberty, but 
life. The carnage of September 11th will transform a new genera-
tion of Americans as much as Pearl Harbor transformed my Un-
cle Bud and his family back home. With the collective experi-
ence of September 11th, we can now see, after years of self-
indulgence masquerading as virtue, that liberty and security are 
more than abstractions to be manipulated in elegantly written 
Supreme Court opinions. A world of danger cannot be dismissed 
with pretty words. Youngstown has an unstated premise that the 
threat to liberty from foreign aggression is less than the threat to 
liberty when the President claims expansive powers to defend 
the nation from such aggression. September 11th was an awak-
ening, an epiphany, to the empirical fact-not the abstract no-
tion- that America had underestimated the danger of deadly 
II. James Joyce, Stephen Hero 213 (Theodore Spencer, ed., Vail-Ballow Press, 
1944). Though a nonbeliever, Joyce obviously borrowed his literary concept from the 
Feast of the Epiphany. 
12. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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aggression on its soil. Wrenched from contentment, we can now 
see that there is less to Youngstown than meets the eye. 
A. SOME GROUND RULES FOR A SKEPTICAL READING 
I take the editor's cue that the purpose of this symposium 
issue of Constitutional Commentary is to assess the relevance of 
Youngstown to American constitutional law a half-century later. 
The majority opinion in Youngstown does not age well. Other 
passages in the concurrences, by Justices Jackson and Frank-
furter in particular, are more enduring as essays about American 
governance. The United States, however, is not a hagiocracy, 
and famous Supreme Court decisions, Youngstown included, de-
serve skepticism rather than genuflection. The opinions of the 
Supreme Court are not the only sources of wisdom about read-
ing the Constitution. The collective experience of witnessing 
thousands of American civilians slaughtered on American soil 
by foreign terrorists on September 11, 2001, is far more impor-
tant to reading the Constitution today than is a case about the 
backlash to the legally clumsy attempt, by a famously unpopular 
President, to invoke national security as the justification for seiz-
ing steel mills during a labor dispute in 1952, an election year in 
which control of the White House subsequently shifted from one 
party to the other. 
I approach my skeptical assessment of Youngstown with 
several ground rules in mind. First, for the purpose of writing 
this essay, and partly because of the tight schedule for this sym-
posium issue, I have intentionally read the opinion only once. 
The last time I read Youngstown carefully was more than a dec-
ade ago in connection with the research for a series of articles 
that I wrote on separation-of-powers topics. 13 
Second, I have undertaken what might be called a "Scalian" 
reading of Youngstown. If Youngstown is really such a landmark, 
then its importance should be readily discernible from the four 
corners of the opinion, without reference to the voluminous sec-
ondary literature that the case has generated or the subsequent 
discussions of the case by the Supreme Court or other courts. 
More specifically, the importance of the decision should be clear 
13. See J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1402 
(1992); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke L.J. 27 (1991); J. Gregory Sidak and 
Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 437 (1990); J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 
1162 (1989); J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 Geo. L.J. 2079 (1989). 
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from a cold reading of the actual words of the majority opinion, 
which counts for only a small fraction of the ink spilled by the 
Justices. I have not attempted to get into the heads of the Jus-
tices to explore the Zeitgeist of Youngstown. Judicial intent in 
1952 is irrelevant. My analysis is very practically minded: What 
immediate questions arise when a skeptical lawyer reads 
Youngstown in 2002? After September 11, 2001, is Youngstown 
still useful in understanding the tradeoff between individual 
freedom and national security? 
B. JUSTICE BLACK'S OPINION FOR THE COURT 
Justice Hugo Black wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority. It 
addressed two legal questions concerning President Truman's sei-
zure of steel mills during a strike in 1952, while the Korean War 
was still in process: 
First. Should final determination of the constitutional validity 
of the President's order be made in this case which has pro-
ceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage? Sec-
ond. If so, is the seizure order within the constitutional power 
of the President?14 
Justice Black's opinion has the virtue of being brief, but its answers 
to both questions are unpersuasive. I consider first the ripeness 
question, which has a remedies question embedded within it. 
1. The Takings Question 
Justice Black found the takings claim ripe, but his reasoning is 
vague and rests heavily on his agreement with the district court, 
whose reasoning in turn he never explained, even in the factual in-
troduction to the opinion.15 So, unless we go read the district court 
opinion (issued only two weeks before the Supreme Court heard 
oral argumene 6), we cannot really say why the case was ripe. But 
referring to the lower decision would violate my Scalian ground 
rule that the reasoning of the majority opinion of a landmark case 
should be clear from its own plain wording. 
Next, Justice Black found that the claims of the steel mill 
owners deserved an injunctive remedy-overriding an order by the 
14. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 584. The district court issued its injunction on April 30, 1952. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stayed the injunction the same day. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on May 3 and heard argument on May 12 & 13, 1952. !d. 
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President of the United States-because "seizure and governmen-
tal operation of these going businesses were bound to result in 
many present and future damages of such nature as to be diffi-
cult, if not incapable, of measurement." 17 Justice Black reached 
this conclusion before explaining the Court's holding with respect 
to the separation-of-powers question posed by the case. So the ra-
tionale for enjoining the taking could not have been that it was ul-
tra vires. The proposition that the seizure of an ordinary business 
like a steel mill is not susceptible of being compensated in mone-
tary terms is as breathtaking as it is silly. One wonders how the sale 
or hypothecation of a steel mill could ever take place if a routine 
discounted cash flow calculation were really so daunting as Justice 
Black would make it seem. 
Since the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
questions of the ripeness of a taking and the measurement of just 
compensation have arisen in complex litigation in which incum-
bent local exchange carriers (ILECs) have asserted that the regu-
lated rates that they must offer to competitive local exchange car-
riers (CLECs) for "unbundled" access to the incumbent 
telecommunications networks are confiscatory.18 The ILECs 
would love to have courts extend to their claims the same judicial 
solicitude toward takings claims exhibited in Youngstown. But, of 
course, that solicitude does not exist today. 19 Viewed a half-
century later, Youngstown is an aberration as a takings case in 
the sense that the private property owner succeeded in enjoining 
the confiscation rather than having to settle for a damage rem-
edy that took for granted the lawfulness of the confiscation. It is 
improbable that any attorney today representing a party in takings 
litigation would build his case around Youngstown. That bit of 
common sense is consistent with the view that the Court in 
Youngstown blew past the takings issue, making unreliable law, to 
reach the separation-of-powers question. 
One might argue, to the contrary, that if there is no presi-
dential power to take private property absent congressional au-
thorization, then the effect of denying injunctive relief is to com-
pel Congress to appropriate funds to compensate private parties 
for a presidential invasion of Article I powers. I disagree for two 
reasons. First, the immediate effect of denying an injunction 
17. Id. at 585. 
18. Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1664, 1679-81 (2002) (dismiss-
ing ILECs takings arguments). . . . 
19. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (ho1dmg takmg clatm not 
ripe). 
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against the alleged presidential taking is, rather, to force the 
courts to adjudicate whether a taking has actually occurred. If 
none has, then the question of whether damages or an injunction 
is the proper remedy disappears. Second, Article II repeatedly 
states that the President "shall have Power" to discharge the ex-
ecutive duties that the Constitution assigns him.20 If it means 
anything in this context, "Power" must encompass the lawful 
ability to obligate the Treasury in limited circumstances required 
for the President's discharge of those textually assigned duties.21 
The fact that section 2 of Article II does not state that the Presi-
dent "shall have Power" to command the army and navy-
whereas he "shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons," 
for example22 -does not imply that the President shall have no 
"Power" to "be Commander in Chief." To "be" without having 
the "Power" to do would be vacuous. 
Apart from being completely unbelievable on its face as an in-
terpretation of the Takings Clause, the Court's conclusion that the 
seizure of the steel mills had no monetary remedy is contradicted 
by its own takings jurisprudence from the World War II era. In 
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,23 the Court in 1949, in an 
opinion written by Justice Frankfurter, recognized a right to 
compensation for the temporary taking of a private laundry by 
the military during World War II. Curiously, none of the opin-
ions in Youngstown discusses or even cites Kimball Laundry. 
The temporary seizure of a steel mill during wartime to ensure a 
steady supply of weapons seems a great deal more defensible 
than the temporary seizure during wartime of a laundry to en-
sure a steady supply of clean towels. Perhaps the latter was au-
thorized by statute while former was not. But that distinction 
should have been irrelevant at this stage of Justice Black's opin-
ion, as he did not address the separation-of-powers question 
(and hence the possibility of ultra vires action by the President) 
until after he had found the seizure of the steel mills to present a 
ripe takings claim. 
Moreover, the asserted difficulty of measuring the "present 
and future damages" from the seizure of steel mills was a canard. 
The same difficulty routinely arises in any civil litigation, yet eq-
uitable relief is the exception rather than the rule. Takings cases 
raise no unique and insuperable problem of measurement or 
20. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2. 
21. See Sidak, 1989 Duke L.J. at 1185 (cited in note 13). 
22. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 2, cl. 1. 
23. 338 U.S. 1 (1949). 
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causation. In Kimball Laundry, Justice Frankfurter only three 
years earlier displayed great agility in addressing how compensa-
tion should be calculated for the federal government's tempo-
rary taking of a business during wartime. Indeed, Kimball Laun-
dry arguably contains the most penetrating economic reasoning 
of any of the Court's takings decisions of the twentieth century, 
because it established the principle that the correct measure of 
just compensation is the property owner's opportunity cost.24 In 
addition, many earlier decisions of the Supreme Court concern-
ing allegations of confiscatory ratemaking for utilities, such as 
Justice Douglas's 1944 opinion for the Court in Hope Natural 
Gas, demonstrate that the Court is able and willing to evaluate 
detailed methods of business valuation.25 Why the lost profits of 
a steel mill are any harder to measure than the fair return on the 
invested capital of a railroad or a telephone company or an elec-
tric utility is not explained anywhere in Justice Black's opinion in 
Youngstown. 
2. The Separation-of-Powers Question 
Justice Black took a mere eight paragraphs to answer the 
separation-of-powers question. His first sentence states: "The 
24. Where income-generating business facilities are appropriated on an ongoing 
basis for government use, or where the government grants third parties mandatory rights 
of access to and use of that property, compensation for that involuntary exchange is 
"just" if it equals the price to which a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree. In 
Kimball Laundry, Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court: 
The value compensable under the Fifth Amendment ... is only that value which 
is capable of transfer from owner to owner and thus of exchange for some 
equivalent. Its measure is the amount of that equivalent. But since a transfer 
brought about by eminent domain is not a voluntary exchange, this amount can 
be determined only by a guess, as well informed as possible, as to what the 
equivalent would probably have been had a voluntary exchange taken place. 
338 U.S. 5-6; accord, Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); United States v. Rey-
nolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970). Subsequent scholarship has further explained the economic 
reasoning behind this insight that just compensation should replicate the outcome of vol-
untary exchange. See J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and 
the Regulatory Contract: The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the 
United States 273-81 (Cambridge U. Press, 1997); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private 
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 182 (Harvard U. Press, 1985). The voluntary-
exchange standard corresponds to the concept of opportunity cost, which Professor Armen 
Alchian classically defined as follows: "the cost of an event is the highest-valued opportu-
nity necessarily forsaken." Armen A. Alchian, Cost, in David L. Sills, ed., 3 International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences404 (Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968). . 
25. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). The earlier 
decisions are numerous. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm 'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of 
Am., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942); Missouri ex reL S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
262 U.S. 276 (1923); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Covington & Lexington Turn-
pike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United 
States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). 
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President's power, if any, to issue the [steel seizure] order must 
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution it-
self."26 Justice Black found neither form of authorization to be 
present. One can give this sentence a narrow reading: President 
Truman's power to seize steel mills, during a labor dispute, on 
the grounds of national security could not be reconciled with any 
statutory or constitutional authorization in light of circumstances 
in early 1952. Perhaps different circumstances would produce a 
different result. 
Alternatively, one can give the sentence a broader reading: 
A President's power on any subject must be authorized by an act 
of Congress or the Constitution itself.27 Put differently, with re-
spect to the President's powers, everything that is not allowed is 
forbidden. Obviously, the broader reading is unnecessary to de-
cide the case. But is not this grander reading the proposition that 
Youngstown is generally thought to represent? The grander 
proposition is what makes the concurring opinions of Justices 
Frankfurter and Jackson so quotable. If that were not true, the 
decision would not be so widely cited and commented upon, and 
there would be no reason to reflect upon the fact that fifty years 
have ~assed since the decision's issuance by the Supreme 
Court. 8 So, for example, Professor Laurence Tribe states in his 
treatise that Youngstown "rebuffs any contention that the Presi-
dent is invested with unbridled discretion to act in the domestic 
arena, even in furtherance of military policy during wartime and 
even in matters affecting U.S. troops deployed in hostilities 
abroad[.]"29 
Justice Black characterized Youngstown as a labor case. 
Discussing the Taft-Hartley Act/0 he said that seizures of plants 
were not authorized by any legislation because "Congress had 
26. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. Later, Justice Black similarly said: "It is clear that 
if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provi-
sions of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language 
grants this power to the President." Id. at 587. 
27. At a textual level, this reading of Justice Black overlooks the question of 
whether, in the absence of enabling legislation, an obligation under a preexisting treaty 
would authorize the President to take actions, like President Truman's, that are not ex-
plicitly authorized by the Constitution. 
28. Consider, for example, how Professor Laurence Tribe quotes Youngstown in his 
influential treatise. See Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law (Foundation 
Press, 3d ed., 2000). He quotes the concurrences of Justice Douglas, Frankfurter, or Jack-
son more than Justice Black's majority opinion. See, e.g., id. at 151, 204 nn.6, 7, 633 n.1, 
635 n.ll, 637 n.l, 650 n.34, 669 nn.73, 75, 671-72,785. 
29. I d. at 671. 
30. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,61 Stat. 136. 
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refused to adopt that method of settling labor disputes."31 Plant 
seizures "would interfere with the process of collective bargain-
ing."32 In other words, Justice Black characterized the objective 
of President Truman's actions to be to resolve a labor dispute, 
rather than to ensure the steady supply of a necessary input to 
prosecute a war. Justice Black rejected the proposition that the 
President's powers as Commander-in-Chief supplied the neces-
sary authorization to seize the steel mills: "Even though 'theater 
of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to 
our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take posses-
sion of private property in order to keep labor disputes from 
stopping production."33 Justice Black brushed aside the cases 
cited by the government without even mentioning their names, 
let alone any attempt to distinguish them.34 
Here it would appear that either Justice Black or President 
Truman was prevaricating. President Truman's executive order 
contained a long list of "whereas" clauses providing his justifica-
tions for seizing the steel mills, the most significant one being the 
following: 
WHEREAS the weapons and other materials needed by 
our armed forces and by those joined with us in the defense of 
the free world are produced to a great extent in this country, 
and steel is an indispensable component of substantially all of 
such weapons and materials;35 
Justice Black did not characterize the presidential objective in 
this way at all. He truncated the war objective from his charac-
terization that President Truman's seizure of the steel mills was 
intended "to keep labor disputes from stopping production. "36 
President Truman saw the defense of the free world, while Jus-
tice Black, his sights a bit lower, saw a labor dispute. The stop-
ping of production was relevant, according to President Truman, 
because it threatened the supply of weapons and materials for 
fighting the Korean War. Either President Truman was exagger-
31. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586. 
32. Id. See also id. at 588 (Congress, but not the President, "can make laws regulat-
ing the relationships between employers and employees, p~escribing rules designed to 
settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and workmg condltlons m certam f1elds of our 
economy."). 
33. Id. at 587. 
34. Id. ("Such cases need not concern us here."). 
35. Id. at 590 (quoting executive order of Apr. 8, 1952) (emphasis added). 
36. Id. at 587. 
2002] THE PRICE OF EXPERIENCE 49 
ating the causal linkage between the steel strike and the prosecu-
tion of the war, or Justice Black was being disingenuous in sever-
ing the last and most critical link in President Truman's chain of 
argumentation. If Justice Black incorrectly characterized Presi-
dent Truman as meddling in a labor dispute that was covered by 
the Taft-Hartley Act, then it would be easy for the Court to 
knock down the straw man that the President's seizure of the 
steel mills was not implicitly authorized by Article II of the Con-
stitution. On the other hand, if President Truman was using the 
Korean War as an excuse for siding with labor during a strike (it 
was obviously the steel mill owners, not the union, that chal-
lenged the seizure as a taking), then Justice Black was correct to 
expose the ruse. 
The opinion then shifts gears. Next, Justice Black addressed 
the President's role in the making of laws. This passage is often 
cited to support the view that the President is less equal than 
Congress in the tripartite scheme of things: 
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power 
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea 
that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his func-
tions in the lawmaking process to the recommendin9 of laws 
he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. 3 
This passage is notable for three reasons. First, it treats the 
President as a kind of cipher and his legislative powers as insub-
stantial. To the contrary, those legislative powers are substantial, 
precisely because synergies exist between the President's execu-
tion of law and his ascertainment of what new laws are needed 
and what old laws should be reformed or repealed.38 Second, the 
passage completely ignores the legislative function inherent in 
the President's duty under Article II to report to Congress annu-
ally on the State of the Union.39 Third, the passage ignores that 
the veto power itself resides in Article I, notwithstanding the 
Constitution's language that "All legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States[.]"40 If 
the specific grant of legislative powers to the President through 
the Veto Clauses did not survive this general grant of ostensibly 
37. Id. 
38. See Sidak, 77 Geo. L.J. at 2085-89 (cited in note 13). 
39. Sec Vasan Kesavan and J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 W. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1 (2002). 
40. U.S. Canst., Art. I,§ 1 (emphasis added). The legislative powers inherent in the 
President's veto, id. § 7, cis. 2, 3, arc explored in Sidak and Smith, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
(cited in note 13). 
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"All legislative Powers" to Congress, then it would have been 
nugatory for the Framers to give the President the veto power. 
Plainly, this is an example of constitutional text being internally 
inconsistent. 
Justice Black recited that Congress had the exclusive power 
to enact legislation "to settle labor disputes" and "to make laws 
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested b.X the Con-
stitution" in all branches of the federal government. 1 Then he 
delivered the most memorable line in the majority opinion: "The 
Founders of this Nation entrusted the law making power to the 
Congress alone in both good and bad times. "42 This line is won-
derful rhetoric-allusive of "for richer for poorer, in sickness 
and in health. "43 But as a legal proposition it requires qualifica-
tion for at least the three reasons listed above. 
More fundamentally, this sentence returns us to the ques-
tion of characterization. Was President Truman's seizure of the 
steel mills a legislative act, or was it a military act taken pursuant 
to his powers as Commander-in-Chief, "in the defense of the 
free world" in America's first open conflict of World War III? 
Justice Black's opinion for the Court so thoroughly denigrates 
the latter possibility that it runs the risk of overstating the case 
about the boundaries of presidential power in matters that genu-
inely do threaten national security, let alone matters that jeop-
ardize the security of the entire free world. Read in this way, 
Youngstown is a power grab by the Court and Congress. It is 
reminiscent of the two notorious power grabs by Congress a 
generation later during the twilight of the Nixon presidency, 
when the United States was losing ground in the Cold War: the 
War Powers Resolution44 and the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.45 Shortly before his resigna-
tion, when Vietnam and Watergate had reduced President Nixon 
to the most disliked chief executive since President Truman, 
Congress enacted these two statutes by override of presidential 
vetoes and, in so doing, redefined by statute-illegitimately, in 
my view-the separation of powers on the consequential matters 
of war and spending.46 Perhaps Youngstown was the Court's way 
41. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89. 
42. ld. at 589. 
43. An Order for Marriage, in The Book of Common Prayer 435,436 (1979 version) 
(Oxford U. Press). 
44. Pub. L. No. 93·148, § 2, Nov. 7, 1973,87 Stat. 555,50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2002). 
45. Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 2, July 12, 1974, 88 Stat. 297, codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 62-88 
(2002). 
46. Sec Sidak, 77 Geo. L.J. at 2130 n.221 (cited in note 13). 
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of telling an unpopular, grasping President that a nation weary 
of war and sacrifice would no longer accede to extravagant 
claims of threats to national security- and if that meant exag-
gerating the constitutional limits on presidential power during 
times of true national peril, then so be it. 
C. THE PREDICTIVE USELESSNESS OF YOUNGSTOWN 
So what guidance could we expect to glean from Youngs-
town after September 11, 2001, if President Bush were temporar-
ily to conscript private property in the name of winning the war 
on terrorism? Not much, most likely. A modern replay of 
Youngstown during the war on terrorism would likely have a dif-
ferent result. Consider the following not-so-hypothetical exam-
ple. 
When the United States began bombing Afghanistan in the 
fall of 2001, there was talk of using therrnobaric bombs-known 
as fuel air explosives (F AEs)- to suck the oxygen from the 
mountain caves of Tora Bora, where Osama Bin Laden and Al-
Qaeda leaders were believed to have taken refuge. In December 
of 2001, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed that the U.S. 
Air Force was not using FAEs in Afghanistan because the stock 
of these weapons had been exhausted during the Persian Gulf 
War and had not been replenished.47 The unavailability of FAEs 
meant that either ground troops (including American soldiers) 
might have to fight cave-to-cave in search of terrorists, or that 
other ordnance would have to be used, such as expensive cruise 
missiles, satellite-guided joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), 
or massive BLU-82/B bombs (known as Daisy Cutters). More-
over, by late December of 2001, London's Daily Telegraph re-
ported that, following the Afghanistan campaign, the United 
States would have to delay any potential attack on Iraq in the 
47. In a press briefing on December 10, 2001, Rear Admiral John Stuftlebeem an-
swered the following question: 
Q: You mentioned the daisy cutter. What about fuel air explosives? Have 
those been used to date, and do you plan on using those to actually suck the air 
out of some of these caves? 
Stufflebeem: I don't think they have been used to date. It's been a long time 
since I've looked at our inventories, but I'm not sure that we have any fuel air 
explosives left in the inventory from after Desert Storm. 
Department of Defense News Briefing-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
and Rear Adm. Stufflebeem, Dec. 10, 2001 (available online at <http://www.defenselink. 
mil/news/Dec2001/t1210200l_t1210dsd.html>). By March 2, 2002, however, U.S. war-
planes did drop two thermobaric bombs in Afghanistan for the first time. Peter Baker 
and Susan B. Glasser, U.S. and Afghan Forces Attack AI Qaeda Refuge; one American 
dies in heavy fighting, Wash. PostAl (Mar. 3, 2002). 
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war on terrorism because the supply of cruise missiles also had 
dwindled.48 Meanwhile, the United States was rushing to develop 
a more sophisticated version of the Daisy Cutter.49 
With these actual facts as background, suppose that in early 
2002 President Bush faced a strike not at steel plants as Presi-
dent Truman did in Youngstown, but at aerospace and electron-
ics companies (such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin) that manu-
facture or supply critical components for F AEs, cruise missiles, 
JDAMs, and Daisy Cutters. Would Youngstown deny President 
Bush the power to seize those plants temporarily to ensure the 
timely production of these essential weapons in the war on ter-
rorism? 
A Supreme Court populated by hermits might promptly 
hold, on the authority of Youngstown, that such action was un-
constitutional. But I doubt that the Court would restrain Presi-
dent Bush's action in this situation by finding him to be acting 
outside his powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same cases of 
government confiscation of private property during war that Jus-
tice Black said "need not concern" the Court in Youngstown 
might be dispositive on this more compelling set of facts.50 
Moreover, after September 11, 2001, the Court might separately 
consider whether Youngstown is distinguishable on purely con-
stitutional grounds. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who clerked for 
Justice Jackson when Youngstown was decided, made the fol-
lowing conjecture in his 1987 book about the Supreme Court: 
I think that if the steel seizure had taken place during the 
Second World War, the government probably would have 
won the case under the constitutional grant to the president of 
the war power, but I also have the distinct feeling that if the 
American objectives and strategy in Korea had been less un-
48. The Daily Telegraph reported: 
Plans for a full-scale strike on Iraq by the United States have been thrown into 
disarray because of a shortage of cruise missiles. America's supply of the air 
launched model, one of the US air force's most sophisticated and deadly weap-
ons, has become so depleted that military chiefs are pressing Boeing, the manu-
facturers, to speed up their production. 
Even so, the first of the new batch of missiles ordered last year is not ex-
pected for months, and it may take longer to rebuild stocks to a level that would 
make such an attack viable. 
Strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 and Kosovo two years ago vir-
tually exhausted the US supply. The number of conventional [non-nuclear] air-
launched cruise missiles left within the inventory is believed to be fewer than 30. 
Sean Rayment, US Missile Shortage Delays Iraq Strike, Sunday Telegraph 2 (Dec. 30, 
2001). 
49. Id. 
50. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. 
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certain, the government probably would have fared better in 
the Supreme Court even without being able to resort to the 
'd , 51 pres1 ent s war power. 
53 
The terrorist attacks of September 11th resemble the attack on 
Pearl Harbor far more than the frustrating prosecution of the 
Korean War. The attacks of 1941 and 2001 occurred on U.S. ter-
ritory and directly targeted the U.S. military. They immediately 
placed the United States at war, without any declaration of war 
by Congress being necessary for the President to exercise all 
available constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief.52 In 
contrast, the American involvement in the Korean War did not 
start with an attack on U.S. territory or U.S. military forces, and 
Congress certainly did not declare war against North Korea, 
China, or any other nation. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has ob-
served, "President Truman and his top advisers deliberatelr re-
frained from asking Congress for a declaration of war[.]" 3 In 
contrast, the steel strike of 1952 followed a long buildup of ten-
sion between labor and management, and President Truman had 
by that time been prosecuting the war for more than a year. Al-
though steel is a raw input for tanks, airplanes, and bombs, it was 
more removed from the war effort in Korea in 1952 than is the 
manufacture of fuel air explosives and cruise missiles in the war 
in 2002 in Afghanistan and other nations that harbor terrorists. 
To ignore how historical context and the personal experi-
ences of the Justices would affect their reading of the Constitu-
tion after September 11th would be to impute to them an un-
natural and unbelievable detachment from the world 
surrounding them. After all, the threat of anthrax letters follow-
ing the September 11th attacks forced the current Court to de-
camp from its ornate building in the fall of 2001. The war on ter-
rorism would not permit the Justices to be hermits even if they 
wished it. 
IV. LIBERTY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
Justice Jackson said, in probably the most frequently quoted 
sentence of his concurrence in Youngstown, that the separation of 
51. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is 97 (William 
Monroe & Co., 1987). 
52. See Sidak, 41 Duke L.J. at 75-79 (cited in note 13). For more than 150 years, 
Congress has declared war only when it has been constitutionally unnecessary for the 
President to receive a declaration of war to wage war. Id. 
53. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is at 96 (cited in note 51). 
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powers "diffuses power the better to secure liberty."54 This state-
ment is a positive conjecture about how American constitutional 
governance works. Some distinguished skeptics have questioned 
whether as an empirical matter the separation of powers has suc-
ceeded in protecting individual liberty relative to some counterfac-
tual arrangement, such as Britain's parliamentary system.55 
Assuming arguendo that the American separation of powers has 
indeed succeeded in limiting the power that government exercises 
over individuals, how well does Justice Jackson's vaunted dictum 
hold during wartime, when mdividual rights presumably have been 
most jeopardized by governmental interference? 
Youngstown protected the right to private property against 
presidential confiscation during wartime. But the broader sweep of 
American history might cast that decision as more the exception 
than the rule. Abraham Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus 
during the Civil War,56 Woodrow Wilson's secret "loyalty order"57 
and his imposition of "voluntary censorship" during World War 
1,58 and Franklin Roosevelt's internment of Japanese Americans 
during World War Il59 all tend to portray Justice Jackson's assess-
54. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
55. See, e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order 1 
(U. of Chicago Press, 1973); Richard A. Posner, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 
5 Const. Comm. 17,18 (1988). 
56. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); see also Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 
(C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis 
Government in the Modern Democracies 223-39 (Princeton U. Press, 1948). 
57. By a confidential executive order issued the day after the United States de-
clared war on Germany, Wilson directed: 
The head of a department or independent office may forthwith remove any em-
ployee when he has ground for believing that the retention of such employee 
would be inimical to the public welfare by reason of his conduct, sympathies or 
utterances, or because of other reasons growing out of the war. Such removal 
may be made ... a matter of confidential record, subject, however, to inspection 
by the Civil Service Commission. 
Executive Order (Apr. 7, 1917), reprinted in Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office 
and Powers, 1787-1984 at 429-30 n.lOO (Randall W. Bland, Theodore T. Hindson and 
Jack W. Peltason, eds., 5th rev. ed. New York U. Press, 1984). 
58. By presidential order on April13, 1917, Wilson created the Committee on Pub-
lic Information -composed of one civilian and the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy-
which at first requested and later directed the press to suppress certain stories concerning 
the war. Proclamation (Apr. 13, 1917), reprinted in 17 A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents 8247 ["Messages and Papers"]. See also Corwin, The President: 
Office and Powers, 1787-1984 at 272 & 502 n.24 (cited in note 57). Within two weeks of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt similarly established an Office of Cen-
sorship, to report directly to the President and to be headed by the then executive ne~s 
director of the Associated Press. Executive Order No. 8985 (Dec. 19, 1941), repnnted m 
1941 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 574 (Samuel I. Rosen-
maned., Harper & Bros.). 
59. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). For a contemporaneous denun-
ciation of the decision, see Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disas-
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ment of the purpose served by the separation of power as an arti-
cle of constitutional faith that falls short of being a persuasive posi-
tive theory of constitutional law. In none of these notorious in-
stances did Congress or the Supreme Court check the President's 
infringement of individual liberty in the name of prosecuting a war. 
Also, there is a curious inversion of priorities here. Economic 
liberty has been less protected from (peacetime) government regu-
lation since at least 1937, while individual freedom has been ele-
vated in its constitutional status.60 It is curious that Youngstown 
would draw a line in the sand with respect to the taking of private 
property, while Korematsu drew no such line with respect to indi-
vidual freedom only eight years earlier.61 After September 11th it 
seems likely that both liberty and property will receive diminished 
constitutional protection in the face of national security concerns, 
even when they are manifested in presidential assertions of pre-
rogative- that is, actions not expressly authorized by legislation or 
constitutional text. 
A. LIBERTY AND COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS 
At the most fundamental level, September 11th has made it 
respectable to speak of conflicts between good and evil.62 To be-
lieve in the existence of evil is no longer to be regarded as super-
stitious, antiquarian, or fanatical. The attack on the United 
States by Islamist terrorists was an empirical fact: The world still 
contains "evil-doers," to use President Bush's phrase.63 It is na-
Ive and dangerous to pretend otherwise. 
That insight, from experience, should cause both litigants 
and courts to temper their constitutional rhetoric. September 
11th is the page of history to Youngstown's volume of logic. Not 
every governmental action presents a slippery slope taking us to 
a loss of civil liberty. The federal government has a compelling 
interest in preventing terrorists from murdering its citizens, dev-
astating its cities, and plunging its industries and their employees 
ter, 54 Yale L.J. 489 (1945). 
60. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 
153 n.4 (1938). 
61. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214. 
62. See, e.g., Ron Rosenbaum, Degrees of Evil: Some Thoughts on Hitler, bin 
Laden, and the Hierarchy of Wickedness 289 The Atlantic Monthly 63 (Feb. 2002). 
63. Remarks by the President Upon Arrival, The South Lawn, 37 Weekly Camp. 
Pres. Doc. 1322 (Sept. 16, 2001) ("We will rid the world of the evildoers."). The biblical 
allusion in the President's choice of words was obvious. Sec, e.g., Psalm 59 ("Rescue me 
from evildoers and save me from those who thirst for my blood."). 
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into financial chaos. September 11th reminds us why English-
speaking peoples since 1549 have repeated Thomas Cranmer's 
prayer for God's deliverance "from violence, battle, and murder; 
and from dying suddenly and unprepared. "64 
The debate over racial, ethnic, or religious profiling of Ar-
abs or Arab Americans poses this issue of slippery slopes. Igno-
rant journalists sometimes speak as though racial or ethnic dis-
crimination is unconstitutional per se. Under this misconception, 
any racial or ethnic profiling to detect terrorists would violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.65 The correct 
question to ask is whether racial or ethnic profiling of Arabs or 
Arab Americans to combat terrorism would survive strict scru-
tiny. Once the issue is correctly characterized, it would seem 
likely that no reasonable disagreement could exist over the com-
pelling governmental interest at stake. One September 11th 
massacre is one too many. Indeed, the first bombing of the 
World Trade Center, in 1993, should have been one too many. 
The only reasonable disagreement can be over whether the 
means employed to combat terrorism are narrowly tailored to 
achieve that compelling governmental interest.66 
September 11th offers a lesson for Congress and state legis-
latures also. Those defending statutes against constitutional chal-
lenge often resort to a form of inflation: Nearly everything the 
government does is a "compelling" interest. Just as it would 
seem that no student at Harvard or Stanford would have been 
admitted if he or she were not expected to get an A in most 
courses, so also it would seem that the mere fact that a legisla-
ture enacts a law means that the governmental objective embod-
ied in that law must be a compelling one for purposes of judicial 
review. Inflation cheapens any currency, whether it is the U.S. 
dollar, an A at a prestigious university, or the notion of what is a 
compelling governmental interest. The image of the World 
Trade Center towers collapsing should instill some sobriety in 
64. The Great Litany, in The Book of Common Prayer 148, 149 (1979 version) (Ox-
ford U. Press). In the Elizabethan English of Cranmer's original text, the Great Litany 
prayed for deliverance "from battaile and murther, and from sodain death." The Litany 
and Sufferages, in The Book of Common Prayer (1549 version). The wording most famil-
iar to the Framers was: "from battle and murder, and from sudden death." The Litany, in 
The Book of Common Prayer (1662 version). 
65. U.S. Canst., Amend. XIV. 
66. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and 
the U.S. Code, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 249, 263-83 (1995) (discussing the history of asserted 
"compelling" government interests in the religious freedom area and suggesting princi-
ples for correcting its deficiency). 
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this respect. Not all "compelling" governmental interests are 
equally compelling. Compared with the objective of preventing 
or punishing terrorism, most "compelling" government interests 
offered up are embarrassingly flimsy and wrongly distract atten-
tion from more weighty challenges. 
This recognition of the insubstantiality of what heretofore 
we had been willing to call "compelling" governmental interests 
corresponds with a number of trends commented upon in the 
popular press after September 11th. Foremost among them was 
the complete revision of Congress's legislative agenda. Before 
September 11th, Social Security reform was a high priority. No 
doubt the preamble or legislative history to such reform legisla-
tion would tell a story of how it is a compelling governmental in-
terest to avoid the projected insolvency of the Social Security 
trust fund several decades from now so as to ensure that retirees 
receive their expected benefits. But no one could respectably ar-
gue that protecting Social Security recipients forty years hence 
from loss of retirement payments is more important than pro-
tecting American citizens today from loss of life due to terrorist 
attacks. Congress's subordination of certain issues on the legisla-
tive agenda is one proxy by which the courts can order, through 
a kind of legislative revealed preference, the genuine hierarchy 
of governmental goals for purposes of judicial review. 
B. RELIGION 
Perhaps, September 11th has changed how we regard gov-
ernment's entanglement with religion. The nation took solace in 
religious expressions of public grief. Christmas 2001 was muted 
and noticeably devoid of the usual lawsuit that a creche scene in 
front of city hall was shaking America to its foundations, threat-
ening the establishment of a state religion by fanatical Chris-
tians.67 The establishment of religion had a new understanding, 
from new experience, that placed matters in perspective in sev-
eral respects. 
First, no asserted establishment of religion occurring in the 
United States in 2002 could possibly compare with practices of 
the former Taliban regime. The subjugation of women, the 
forced amputations, the public executions in Kabul's soccer sta-
dium were a far cry from a prayer at a graduation ceremony or 
67. E.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU Gremer Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989) (menorah constitutional, creche scene unconstitutional). 
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high school football game.68 Islamist fanaticism was distinguish-
able in kind and in degree from government accommodations in 
the United States of private expressions of religious belief in the 
public square. The Taliban regime was a reminder to Americans 
to refrain from crying wolf and to view slippery-slope arguments 
about the government's establishment of (Judea-Christian) relig-
ion in the United States with a skepticism born of practical ex-
perience rather than the innocent shrillness that sometime at-
tends rationalist abstraction. 
Second, a serious question was debated: Is the United States 
at war with terrorists and the regimes that sponsor or shelter 
them, or is the United States really at war with Islam itself?69 
There were, of course, numerous assurances from President 
Bush that the latter was not the case and that the United States 
regarded Islam as a religion that preaches peace and toleration. 
But the emphasis with which this message was officially dissemi-
nated-from the President's solicitation of donations for Afghan 
children to his observance of Ramadan in the White House-
caused some to question whether the government's policy in this 
respect was propaganda intended to mollify Muslim nations 
whose assistance the United States wanted in its war on terror-
ism. It might have appeared to some that the government was 
doing considerably more in the fall of 2001 to accommodate Is-
lam in the United States than, say, Roman Catholicism. In his 
powerful speech before Congress and Justices of the Supreme 
Court on September 20, 2001, President Bush said, addressing 
"Muslims throughout the world," that "those who commit evil in 
the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. "70 The gov-
ernment would seem to be deeply entangled with religion when 
the President uses the authority of his office to announce to the 
other branches of government, the nation, and world at large 
what constitutes blasphemy as a matter of Islamic doctrine. This 
presidential message was uncharted territory, and it appeared 
that no one would complain about a modest amount of U.S. 
government certification of Muslim religious doctrine if that was 
the price of gathering the support of Muslim countries in the war 
68. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding prayer at 
public high school football game unconstitutional); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 
(holding prayer at public school commencement unconstitutional). 
69. For exploration of the conflict between Islam and the West, see Bernard Lewis, 
What Went Wrong Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (Oxford U. Press, 2001); 
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years (Scribner, 1995). 
70. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Sept. 20, 
2001. 
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on terrorism, a foreign policy objective considered advantageous 
for the effective prosecution of the war. Still, the war of informa-
tion and propaganda being waged by the United States was es-
tablishing an official view of Islam that delved far more deeply 
into matters of religious doctrine than did the nondenomina-
tional prayers at graduations and football games that previously 
had been considered weighty controversies deserving and receiv-
ing the Supreme Court's attention. 
Third, Americans were confronted with the unsettling ques-
tion: What if there is an irreconcilable divide between the Is-
lamic world and the western world, the latter being largely but 
not exclusively Judeo-Christian in its religious foundation? Was 
President Bush's faux pas in the early days after September 11th, 
in which he used the word "crusade" to describe the intended re-
sponse of the United States and its allies, actually a more accu-
rate picture of American sentiment than the public face of tol-
eration toward Islam that was carefully scripted to follow?71 If 
our enemy were not a sovereign nation, but rather a stateless 
army of religious fanatics, how would that enemy fit within the 
conventional notions of war? For example, congressional expres-
sions of approval or disapproval of the President's prosecution 
of the war (as manifested, for example, in actions taken pursuant 
to the War Powers Resolution) would have to be couched in 
terms of legislation defining an enemy by its religious fervor 
rather than its nationality or geography. 72 And, to mix constitu-
tional doctrine, how could the United States be actively attempt-
ing to capture or kill members of Al-Qaeda or the Taliban lead-
ership without manifesting hostility toward a group that defines 
itself by its extremist interpretations of Islamic teachings? Of 
course, such curiosities did not get in the way of the President's 
prosecution of the war. But that fact does not mean that the an-
swers are easy. 
C. GOVERNORS 
The aftermath of September 11th raised a federalism issue. 
On November 1, 2001, Governor Gray Davis, acting on a non-
public FBI warning, deployed the California Highway Patrol and 
71. Remarks by the President Upon Arrival, The South Lawn, 37 Weekly Comp. 
Pres. Doc. 1323 (Sept. 16, 2001) {"This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a 
while."). 
72. Cf. J. Gregory Sidak, True God of the Next Justice, 18 Canst. Comm. 9 (2001) 
(arguing that it is both intractable and improper for senators to question a judicial nomi-
nee about either the tenets of his religious sect or the intensity of his religious devotion). 
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the National Guard to defend against the threat of an imminent 
terrorist attack on the Golden Gate Bridge and other major 
bridges in the state.73 Some unnamed federal officials criticized 
him for disclosing the FBI's warning and, they asserted, overre-
acting to it.74 The implication of the criticism was that the gover-
nor was stepping on the Commander-in-Chief's turC5 If the mo-
tivation for that criticism was more than partisan political pique 
(Governor Davis would be a plausible presidential candidate 
challenging President Bush in 2004), then perhaps it sprang from 
the same concerns that motivated the Supreme Court a decade 
earlier to reprimand one governor for trying to direct U.S. for-
eign policy by placing limits on the use of his state's national 
guard.76 
But any criticism of Governor Davis on this occasion was 
unjustified, because the Constitution empowers him to wage 
war. The circumstances, of course, are limited: "No State shall, 
without the Consent of Congress, ... engage in War, unless ac-
tually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of 
delay. "77 It is not clear that this power of the states is preempted 
by the President's power to command "the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States."78 
In light of the carnage of September 11th, an FBI warning 
of an imminent terrorist attack surely satisfies the requirement 
of "imminent Danger." After all, Attorney General Ashcroft, his 
ashen face suggesting that he knew more than he could say, had 
made multiple televised warnings of credible but unspecified 
threats of further, imminent terrorist attacks. There can be no 
quibbling that, if a state may "engage in War" when the immi-
nent danger can be discerned with sufficient clarity to respond, 
then the state also may, when confronted by such warnings from 
the federal government, engage in measures short of engaging in 
war that afford that state's citizens the best available defense 
against war, invasion, or actual danger. 
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Finally, who decides whether the imminent danger "will not 
admit of delay"? This question must rest with the state-and 
there, with the governor as the state's analog to a commander-
in-chief. Any federal role in the decision would make the clause 
unnecessary. in the first place. If a federal court or Congress or 
the President could review the governor's decision, then this 
constitutional grant of power to the states would be one that 
could never be exercised, and thus the clause would be pointless 
verbiage. On November 2, 2001, President Bush rendered a po-
litical opinion of sorts that is consistent with such a constitutional 
interpretation. He backed up Governor Davis on his warning to 
Californians: "As a former governor, I didn't particularly care 
when the federal government tried to tell me how to do my busi-
ness . . . And I think any governor should be able to conduct 
their business any way they see fit. "79 Uncertainty begets pre-
rogative and deference. As Governor Davis said, there is "no 
playbook for these times. "80 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ancient Egyptians designed Abu Simbal so that, for 
only a few minutes twice each year, the first rays of sunrise illu-
minate the temple's inner sanctum. September 11, 2001, was like 
that infrequent shaft of sunlight. It will change how we read the 
Constitution, and it will diminish the value of the elegant ab-
straction of a famous court decision like Youngstown. September 
11th was an intense, common experience that informed us about 
the balance between individual liberty and collective security. 
That experience reminds us that the text of the Constitution is 
replete with references to war, because the same Framers who 
devised the separation of powers and later wrote the Bill of 
Rights also saw the need to be vigilant in a dangerous world. It is 
an exaggeration to say that everything is different now. The 
words of the Constitution have not changed since September 
11th. It has always been the case that the first duty that Article 
II, section 2 imposes on the President is to be Commander-in-
Chief. What has changed, through experience, is our collective 
understanding of why the government's highest obligation under 
the Constitution is to defend its citizens. 
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